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Introduction 
 
The 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds of the EU resulted in the accession of twelve 
countries, predominantly located in Central- and Eastern Europe. At the time, the ‘new’ 
member states compassed an access of over one hundred million citizens. All of these 
Central- and Eastern European (hereinafter: ‘CEE-‘) migrants were added to the workforce of 
the EU and enjoyed the rights to move and work within the EU. This meant that CEE-citizens 
could move, live, and work in the Netherlands and the other members of the ‘old-EU’1.  
 Subsequently, this work will examine the situation of CEE-migrants within the 
Netherlands. The reason for this topic is that most literature on the intra-EU migration flows 
following the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds focuses on economic aspects: the effects on 
either the host or sending member states’ economy. Moreover, there is limited attention to the 
social aspects of CEE-migration.           
 To supplement the academic debate, this paper will narrow itself down to the social 
position of CEE- migrants in the Netherlands; with a focus on Bulgarian, Polish, and 
Romanian citizens. The reason for this is that they form the largest share of the CEE-citizens 
present in the Netherlands. Additionally, there are certain stereotypes surrounding these 
groups. Moreover, the added value of this study is that it forms a wide ranged examination of 
the social situation of CEE-migrants in the Netherlands. Similar studies, and those on other 
EU-15 member states, are generally limited to a region or city, or only on one specific CEE-
group, or are narrowed down to a single social factor; such as living conditions, the position 
of CEE-children, or criminal activities.       
 To start off, this work will provide a historical background of the enlargement rounds 
of 2004 and 2007 and will show the theoretical aspects of intra-EU mobility. The so-called 
‘transitional measures’ will be briefly mentioned, as this allowed the EU-15 member states to 
control the future migration of CEE-migrants, as they could decide to open or restrict access 
to the labour markets. Thus, that section will be used to illustrate the expectations amongst 
the EU-15 with the prospect of CEE-workers moving to their countries. The first chapter will 
also provide reasons as to why CEE-workers migrated to the EU-15. Such motives behind  
                                                          
1 The ‘old-EU’ typically refers to the fifteen EU-members states prior to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. These 
member states shall be referred to as the ‘EU-15’. 
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migration will be illustrated by examining the academic theory on the intra-EU migration 
surrounding the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds.      
 The next chapter will contain data and information of the ‘Statistics Netherlands’ on 
CEE-migrants in the Netherlands. This information will describe the number of CEE-
migrants residing in the Netherlands, classified by member state of origin. Such data can also 
be used to compare the number of CEE-migrants to that of other foreign groups in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the data shall be divided based on gender, as this can give insight 
behind the intentions for migration. Finally, these migration motives can be further 
highlighted by examining the geographical distribution of CEE-migrants in the Netherlands. 
 The following sections of this work will deal with specific social problems 
encountered by CEE-workers in the Netherlands. For instance, problems in terms of housing 
and living conditions, crime rates, share of social security benefit programs and the degree of 
integration into Dutch society. To this extent, the chapters will analyse several reports of 
Dutch government agencies, as these reports do not include extensive explanations. One 
chapter will revolve around aspects of labour, more specifically: labour exploitation. The 
reason for this is that many CEE-migrants arrived with the intent to work and labour 
exploitation can affect the social sphere of individuals.     
 Subsequently, the last chapter and conclusion relies on qualitative information 
obtained from key actors, most notably by civil servants of municipalities with high 
concentrations of CEE-migrants. The reason for this type of approach is two-fold. Firstly, 
these actors are dealing directly with CEE-migrants and in most research only one single 
respondent is chosen. Secondly, academic literature generally relies on conducting interviews 
with migrants. Such an approach may not always be representative, due to the limited number 
of participants and the willingness to fully expose themselves. As such, this method of 
questioning civil servants creates a wide view to illustrate the social situation of CEE-
migrants in several municipalities.        
 The final part of this work will provide a conclusion, including a summary of the 
previous chapters along with recommendations for policy makers to tackle the social 
problems of CEE-citizens in the Netherlands.  
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Intra-EU Mobility and the 2004 and 2007 Enlargement Rounds 
 
The impending migration flows prior to the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds were met 
with concern within the EU-15 member states. The fear was that an influx of migrants might 
exert too much pressure on a welfare system. Additionally, jobs could be taken over from the 
native population, as it was believed that CEE-migrant workers would be cheaper.23  
 The EU-15 member states were given the opportunity to adopt legislation and policies 
to deal with the forthcoming migration of CEE-citizens.4 This resulted in possibility to 
temporarily restrict the movement of CEE-workers5 to the EU-15 labour markets: the 
‘transitional arrangements’.6 These transitional arrangements were the most important tools 
to influence the forthcoming migration influx.7 The United Kingdom was one of three 
member states that decided not to restrict labour market access, resulting in an unexpected 
high inflow of CEE-migrants.8 In fact, the United Kingdom had to put forth several 
mechanisms to combat illegal employment and prevent exploitation of the CEE-migrants.9
 However, the transitional arrangements were circumvented, as CEE-citizens adopted 
the position of a (bogus) posted worker or pretended to be self-employed. In fact, such bogus 
constructions were often at reduced wages; threatening the income and employment of native 
workers.10 This route towards employment was highly popular, as it was noted by the 
Commission that the restrictive nature of the transitional arrangements led to an exceptionally  
                                                          
2 Galgóczi, B, J. Leschke., ‘Intra-EU Labour Mobility After Eastern Enlargement and During the Crisis: Main 
Trends and Controversies’, in: Holtslag, J.W, M. Kremer, E. Schrijvers (eds.)., ‘Making Migration Work – The 
future of labour migration in the European Union, pp. 83, 2013. 
3 Barslund, M, M. Busse., ‘Too Much or Too Little Labour Mobility? State of Play and Policy Issues’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 116-117, 2014. 
4 Elsner, B., ‘Does emigration benefit the stayers? Evidence from EU enlargement’, in: Journal of Popular 
Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 534, (531-553), 2013. 
5 Workers from Cyprus and Malta were excluded and gained full access. 
6 European Commission., ‘Employment in Europe 2008’, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities, pp. 111-113, 2008. 
7 Galgóczi, B, J. Leschke., ‘Intra-EU Labour Mobility After Eastern Enlargement and During the Crisis: Main 
Trends and Controversies’, in: Holtslag, J.W, M. Kremer, E. Schrijvers (eds.)., ‘Making Migration Work – The 
future of labour migration in the European Union, pp. 94-95, 2013. 
8 Vargas-Silva, C., ‘EU Migration to the UK: Trends and Impacts’, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 123, 
2014. 
9 Galgóczi, B, J. Leschke., ‘Intra-EU Labour Mobility After Eastern Enlargement and During the Crisis: Main 
Trends and Controversies’, in: Holtslag, J.W, M. Kremer, E. Schrijvers (eds.)., ‘Making Migration Work – The 
future of labour migration in the European Union’, pp. 95, 2013. 
10 Galgóczi, B, J. Leschke., ‘Intra-EU Labour Mobility After Eastern Enlargement and During the Crisis: Main 
Trends and Controversies’, in: Holtslag, J.W, M. Kremer, E. Schrijvers (eds.)., ‘Making Migration Work – The 
future of labor migration in the European Union‘, pp. 95-97, 2013. 
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high influx”.11 Finally, these constructions circumvented legislation in terms of health and 
safety regulations, social rights and employment rules.12 As shown the transitional 
arrangements did not prevent CEE-workers from entering the EU-15 labour markets. In fact, 
between 2003 and 2007 the number of CEE-workers13 increased from 924.000 to 2.016.000. 
Moreover, Bulgarian and Romanian workers were significantly present in the EU-15, despite 
that their countries had not joined the EU yet: 691.000 in 2003, and in 2006 it had more than 
doubled to 1.331.000.14 This led some scholars to state that the accession rounds would not 
cause a massive influx: it had already occurred.15 However, some authors expected that most 
CEE-workers would migrate on a temporary basis, as there were no ties to the destination 
country. Moreover, the migrants typically held temporary or low-skilled occupations which 
would not provide sufficient income to obtain adequate family accommodations.16 
 Other scholars compared the forthcoming expansion with prior rounds; more 
specifically, the ‘Mediterranean Enlargement’ of the 1980s. The reason was that these three 
countries – Greece, Spain and Portugal - were also economically less developed. If 
(significant) differences in income levels formed the prime reason behind intra-EU migration, 
then the ‘Mediterranean’ enlargement should have led to high levels of migration. Yet, 
historically, intra-EU labour mobility in the EU-15 was “very low”.17 Additionally, it was 
suggested that CEE-workers had no pressing need to migrate.18 Overall, such studies 
predicted that there would be a minor wave of CEE-migrants.19    
 In fact, the CEE-enlargement migration flows to the EU-15 member states were 
significantly higher than during the ‘Mediterranean’-enlargement, despite comparable 
                                                          
11 European Commission., ‘Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 
Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006)’, COM (2006) 48 final, pp. 5, 2006. 
12 Dobson, J.R, I. Sennikova., ‘From fundamental freedom to policy and economic ‘hot potato’ in 50 years: 
Labour mobility and migration within the EU’, in: Journal of Business Economics and Management, Vol. 8, No. 
2, pp. 124-126, 2007. 
13 Excluding workers originating from Bulgaria and Romania. 
14 Fertig, M, M. Kahanec., ‘Projections of potential flows to the enlarging EU from Ukraine, Croatia and other 
Eastern neighbors’, in: IZA Journal of Migration, Vol. 4, No.6, pp. 4-5, 2015. 
15 Zimmermann, K.F., ‘European Labour Mobility: Challenges and Potentials’, in: De Economist, Vol. 153, No. 
4, pp. 428, 2005.ad 
16 Dobson, J.R, I. Sennikova., ‘From fundamental freedom to policy and economic ‘hot potato’ in 50 years: 
Labour mobility and migration within the EU’, in: Journal of Business Economics and Management, Vol. 8, 
No.2, pp. 133, 2007. 
17 Barslund, M, M. Busse., ‘Too Much or Too Little Labour Mobility? State of Play and Policy Issues’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 116-118, 2014. 
18 Fertig. M., ‘The economic impact of EU-enlargements: assessing the migration potential’, in: Empirical 
Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 719, 2001. 
19 Dustmann, C.M, M. Casanova, M. Fertig, I. Preston, C.M. Schmidt., ‘The Impact of EU Enlargement on 
migration flows’, Home Office Report, No. 25/03, pp. 44, 2003.  
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economic development.20 A possible explanation was found in cheaper moving costs, along 
with better communication due to technological developments and reduced bureaucracy.21 
When moving costs are relatively high this makes it less attractive and more uncertain to 
migrate, as opposed to cheap moving costs. Therefore, as moving costs were higher in the 
1980s and 1990s, this contributed to the historical limited intra-EU mobility rates.22  
 The migration flows following the CEE-enlargement are characterised as 
‘spectacular’23 and as creating a ‘new migration system’2425. The effects were felt in the 
sending member states, as several – Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia – lost almost 10% 
of the workforce.26 Additionally, the post-accession migration flows were also wider 
distributed amongst the EU-15.27 To illustrate, certain towns and cities experienced an 
increase between 200%-400% of CEE-inhabitants in a short period.28 This increase resulted 
in CEE-migrants forming the largest group of non-native inhabitants in numerous areas.29 
 Still, even though the actual number of CEE-migrants was larger than projected some 
authors expected even higher figures, due to unemployment in the CEE-countries.30 Yet, 
when comparing the total CEE-population and the initial number of CEE-migrants, it showed 
that a smaller portion decided to migrate.31 Regardless, there were concerns on the influx of 
(cheap) labour. One of the proposed effects of the CEE-enlargement rounds was a ‘race to the 
                                                          
20 Barslund, M, M. Busse., ‘Too Much or Too Little Labour Mobility? State of Play and Policy Issues’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No.3, pp. 117, 2014. 
21 Luthra, R.R, L. Platt, J. Salamonska., ‘Migrant diversity, migration motivations and early integration: the case 
of Poles in Germany, the Netherlands, London and Dublin’, in: ISER Working Paper Series, No. 18, pp. 10-11, 
2014. 
22 Fertig, M, M. Kahanec., ‘Projections of potential flows to the enlarging EU from Ukraine, Croatia and other 
Eastern neighbors’, in: IZA Journal of Migration, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 3, 2015. 
23 Kaczmarczyk, P, M. Okolski., ‘Demographic and Labor Market Impacts of Migration on Poland’, in: Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 601, 2008. 
24 Favell, A., ‘The new face of East-West migration in Europe’, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 704, 2008. 
25 Galgóczi, B, J. Lesckhe., ‘Post-Enlargement Intra-EU Labour Mobility Under Stress Test’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 152, 2014. 
26 Elsner, B., ‘Emigration and Wages: The EU enlargement experiment’, in: Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 91, pp. 154, 2013. 
27 Brücker, et al., ‘Labour mobility within the EU in the context of enlargement and the functioning of the 
transitional arrangements’, in: Final Report of the European Integration Consortium, pp. 39-40, 62-63, 117-128, 
155-157, 2009. 
28 Vargas-Silva, C., ‘EU Migration to the UK: Trends and Impacts’, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No.3, pp. 23-
24, 2014.  
29 Krausova, A, C. Vargas-Silva., ‘East Midlands: Census Profile’, Migration Observatory Briefing, pp. 4-11, 
2013. 
30 Josifidis, K, N. Supic, E.B. Pucar, S. Srdic., ‘Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs EU-15’, in: Journal of 
Business Economics and Management, Vol. 15, No.1, pp. 50, 2014. 
31 Kancs, A., ‘Labour migration in the enlarged EU: a new economic geography approach’, in: Journal of 
Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 14, No.2, pp. 172, 2011. 
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bottom’ in income levels of the EU-15, due to the threat of cheap CEE-labour costs.32 
 Apart from high income levels as the main pull-indicator in intra-EU migration, there 
were important push-factors as well. For instance, some authors examined the economic 
situation of the sending country. In the case of Poland, a constant oversupply of labour was 
found. Thus, low labour participation rates were presented as the prime reason for Polish 
workers to migrate.33 Additionally, the introduction of EU- social and labour legislation were 
linked to rising unemployment levels. It is argued that this caused an economic shock 
amongst the CEE-countries, as they were transitioning towards market economies following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.34          
 There are also proposed benefits for the EU-15 in receiving CEE-migrants. The most 
heard notion is that the EU-15’s economies require low-skilled workers, due to a lack of 
domestic supply and the overall declining workforce. Moreover, it is often stated that the 
native population is unwilling to work in ‘undesirable’ occupations. Thus, there is a 
possibility for CEE-migrants to fill in such jobs. In fact, it is mentioned that low-skilled CEE-
workers are more important to the EU-15 than high-skilled migrants.35 Regarding the 
declining workforce, low birth rates and an ageing population create a necessity for (young) 
CEE-workers.36          
 A common negative notion is that CEE-migrants may arrive with the intend to receive 
welfare benefits. In a way to deter welfare migrants from arriving, it was expected that 
member states would reduce social security levels.37 This did not occur, as the CEE-
enlargement rounds did not lead to a downward spiral in social security levels.38 Several 
studies focussed on the link between social security and the attractiveness for migrants to 
move to member states with ‘generous’ welfare schemes.39 This notion is enhanced when the 
                                                          
32 Afonso, A., ‘Employer strategies, cross-class coalitions and the free movement of labour in the enlarged 
European Union’, in: Socio-Economic Review, pp. 1-26, 2012. 
33 Kaczmarczyk. P., ‘EU Enlargement and Intra-EU Mobility – Lessons to Be Drawn from the Post-2004 
Migration of Poles’, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 131, 2014. 
34 Belke, A, M. Hebler., ‘Towards a European Social Union: Impacts on Labor Markets in the Acceding 
Countries’, in: Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 13, pp. 321-333, 2002. 
35 Kaczmarczyk, P., ‘EU Enlargement and Intra-EU Mobility – Lessons to Be Drawn from the Post-2004 
Migration of Poles’, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 136, 2014. 
36 Muysken, J, T. Ziesemer., ‘The effect of net immigration on economic growth in an ageing economy: 
transitory and permanent shocks’, in: UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series, Vol. 2011, No. 55, pp. 1-54, 2011. 
37 Sinn, H., ‘EU Enlargement and the Future of the Welfare State’, in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 107-110, 2002. 
38 Skupnik, C., ‘EU enlargement and the race to the bottom of welfare states’, in: IZA Journal of Migration, Vol. 
3, No. 15, pp. 6, 2014. 
39 Borjas. G.J., ‘The Economic Analysis of Immigration’, in: O. Ashenfelter, D. Cards (eds.)., Handbook of 
Labor Economics, pp. 1697-1760, 1999. 
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costs of migration are low.40 Subsequently, this theory (de Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009; Warin 
& Svaton, 2008) implies that member states with less generous welfare systems do not form 
attractive destinations. However, a generous welfare state may also deter high skilled 
migrants, as generous welfare systems usually have high levels of redistributive taxation.41 
Other studies showed that high skilled migrants are net contributors to the welfare system, 
while low skilled workers are more inclined to be net beneficiaries.42 However, it is argued 
that the effects of intra-EU migration on social assistance spending requires an examination 
on the long term.43           
 In fact, CEE-citizens were found to have higher employment rates  than the native 
population and receive less welfare benefits.44 In fact, CEE-workers were found to be 
employed but with an income below levels of subsistence; filling this gap with social 
assistance.45 To conclude, the academic consensus is that income differences are more 
significant in the decision to migrate than (generous) welfare systems and that CEE-migrants 
do not have a disproportionate share in social assistance recipients.46   
 There is extensive research on the characteristics of CEE-migrants; most notably on 
age, educational attainment and occupational capacity. A common notion in academic work 
is that most CEE-migrants tend to be young, unmarried and highly educated.474849 However, 
they are primarily active in low-skilled occupations and often at reduced wages.50 These 
aspects were already mentioned before the enlargement rounds and, perhaps surprisingly, 
unemployment was not a significant push factor: only 2%-3% of unemployed CEE-citizens 
                                                          
40 Baas, T., ‘The Macroeconomics Impact of Intra-EU Migration on the Germany Economy’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 142, 2014. 
41 Razin, A., ‘MIGRATION into the WELFARE STATE: tax and migration competition’, in: International Tax 
and Public Finance, Vol. 20, pp. 549, 2013. 
42 Josifidis, K, N. Supic, E.B. Pucar, S. Srdic., ‘Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs EU-15’, in: Journal of 
Business Economics and Management, Vol. 15, No.1, pp. 43-45, 2014. 
43 Razin, A, E. Sadka., ‘Welfare Migration: Is the net fiscal burden a good measure of its economic impact on 
the welfare of the native born population?’, in: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 
Series, No. 10682, pp. 1-10, 2004. 
44 Galgóczi, B, J. Lesckhe., ‘Post-Enlargement Intra-EU Labour Mobility Under Stress Test’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 152-158, 2014. 
45 Baas, T., ‘The Macroeconomic Impact of Intra-EU Migration on the German Economy’, in: Intereconomics, 
Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 142, 2014. 
46 Josifidis, K. N. Supic, E.B. Pucar, S. Srdic., ‘Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs EU-15’, in: Journal of 
Business Economics and Management, Vol. 15, No.1, pp. 46-47, 50, 2014. 
47 Pollard, N. M. Latorre, D. Sriskandarajah., ‘Floodgates or turnstiles? Post-EU enlargement migration flows 
to (and from) the UK’, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), pp. 24-28, April 2008. 
48 Blanchflower, D.G, C. Shadforth., ‘Fear, Unemployment and Migration’, in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 
119, No. 535, pp. 179-180, 2009. 
49 Zimmermann, K.F., ‘European Labour Mobility: Challenges and Potentials’, in: De Economist, Vol. 153, pp. 
429, 2005. 
50 Favell, A., ‘The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe’, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 701-716, 2008. 
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expected to migrate.51 In line with being young, many CEE-migrants lacked work experience 
in their country of origin.52 On the other hand, young CEE-migrants often have high levels of 
production and entrepreneurial potential.53        
 The prevalence of young CEE-migrants can be seen in the share of the native 
population age group, which often is double or even triple as high.54 This led to the claim that 
CEE-member states experienced a ‘youth drain’ following their accession to the EU.55 
Moreover, it was found (Docquier, Lohest & Marfouk, 2007) that when large numbers of 
highly skilled workers migrate abroad, such ‘brain drain’ of human capital may hinder 
countries in their economic development.      
 Despite being highly educated, CEE-migrants are often active in low-skilled 
occupations; a phenomenon described as ‘down skilling’.56 This mismatch in educational 
attainment and occupation negatively affects the allocation of human capital within the EU.57 
Accordingly, this “wide-spread” tendency was documented in Italy and the United 
Kingdom.58 In fact, the educational attainment of CEE-migrants is often higher than that of 
the native population.59 This tendency to be higher educated than the native workforce is 
described as a first in the history of migration.60 The result is that income levels and low-
skilled employment face heavy competition which pressures the lower segments of the native 
population, especially if CEE-migrants are concentrated in certain sectors.61 CEE-workers 
often lack language skills. To illustrate, CEE-workers in the United Kingdom barely spoke 
                                                          
51 Krieger, H., ‘Migration trends in an enlarged Europe’, in: Quality of Life in Europe Series, European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, pp. 66, 2004. 
52 Drinkwater, S. J. Eade, M. Garapich., ‘Poles Apart? EU Enlargement and the Labour Market Outcomes of 
Immigrants in the UK’, in: International Migration, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 162-190, 2009. 
53 Josifidis, K. N. Supic, E.B. Pucar, S. Srdic., ‘Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs EU-15’, in: Journal of 
Business Economics and Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 50, 2014. 
54 Ibidem, pp. 50-51. 
55 Elsner, B., ‘Emigration and Wages: The EU enlargement experiment’, in: Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 91, pp. 154-163, 2013. 
56 Kahanec, M., ‘Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union’, in: World Bank Social Protection & 
Labor Discussion Paper, No. 1301, pp. 1-136, 2013. 
57 Kaczmarczyk, P., ‘EU Enlargement and Intra-EU Mobility – Lessons to Be Drawn from the Post-2004 
Migration of Poles’, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 136, 2014. 
58 Galgóczi, B, J. Leschke., ‘Intra-EU Labour Mobility After Eastern Enlargement and During the Crisis: Main 
Trends and Controversies’, in: Holtslag, J.W, M. Kremer, E. Schrijvers (eds.)., ‘Making Migration Work – The 
future of labor migration in the European Union‘, pp. 93-94, 2013. 
59 Elsner, B., ‘Does emigration benefit the stayers? Evidence from EU enlargement’, in: Journal of Population 
Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 542-543, 2013. 
60 Galgóczi, B, J. Leschke., ‘Intra-EU Labour Mobility After Eastern Enlargement and During the Crisis: Main 
Trends and Controversies’, in: Holtslag, J.W., M. Kremer, E. Schrijvers (eds.)., ‘Making Migration Work – The 
future of labor migration in the European Union’, pp. 97, 2013. 
61 Blanchflower, D.G, C. Shadforth., ‘Fear, Unemployment and Migration’, in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 
119, No. 535, pp. 136-182, 2009. 
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English or German.62 It is noted that lacking language skills lead to CEE-workers accept 
lower wages, either because of this human capital deficit or the unawareness and inability to 
negotiate on social- and labour rights.63       
 The influx of EU-10 migrants can also lead to social problems. The social cohesion 
within a society may be at risk. For instance, as CEE-migrants require housing and 
employment this leads to competition with the native population. Additionally, when CEE-
migrants make use of social benefits this places a burden on public spending.64 Integration by 
the CEE-migrants may also – aside from practical elements such as language – be hindered 
by different religious- and social customs.65 To conclude, such differences pose as a threat to 
the sense of cohesion of a society; especially when the influx of migrants is considered as 
(too) high.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 Dobson, J.R, I. Sennikova., ‘From fundamental freedom to policy and economic ‘hot potato’ in 50 years: 
Labour mobility and migration within the EU’, in: Journal of Business Economics and Management, Vol. 8, 
No.2, pp. 133, 2007. 
63 Barslund, M, M. Busse., ‘Too Much or Too Little Labour Mobility? State of Play and Policy Issues’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 120, 2014. 
64 Dobson, J.R, I. Sennikova., ‘From fundamental freedom to policy and economic ‘hot potato’ in 50 years: 
Labour mobility and migration within the EU’, in: Journal of Business Economics and Management, Vol. 8, No. 
2, pp. 131-132, 2007. 
65 Delhey, J., ‘Do enlargements make the European Union less cohesive? An analysis of trust between EU 
nationalities’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 253-279, 2007. 
66 Rhys, A., ‘Labour migration, communities and perceptions of social cohesion in England’, in: European 
Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 78-80, 2015. 
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Destination: the Netherlands 
 
This chapter will elaborate on the number of CEE-citizens living in the Netherlands and their 
geographical distribution. By doing so this chapter will provide solid background for the 
further sections o this work. The chapter makes use of data gathered by the Statistics 
Netherlands, the CBS67. As this agency forms the main institutional body on statistics in the 
Netherlands, it has the most encompassing data. For measuring the number of CEE-citizens 
present in the Netherlands, the CBS uses data of the civil registry of local municipalities. 
However, not all CEE-citizens registers themselves: thus, the data from the CBS is limited. 
Moreover, migrants who intend to reside in the Netherlands for a period of under four months 
are not obliged to register at local municipalities.68 It has been noted that between a third and 
half of the CEE-migrants register themselves, irrespective of whether they reside in the 
Netherlands on a permanent or temporary basis.6970 Regardless, the CBS provides the most 
comprehensive information useful to examine the number of CEE-citizens residing in the 
Netherlands.          
 According to the Statistics Netherlands71, on 1 January 2015 a total of 230.500 CEE-
migrants were registered in the Netherlands. This number is likely to be higher, as large 
groups of CEE-migrants are not registered at local municipalities. Along their respective 
country of origin CEE-migrants can be divided into eleven groups: Bulgarians, Czechs, 
Estonians, Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Romanians, Slovenians, Slovakians, and 
Czechoslovakians. The group of Czechoslovakians (15.030) shall be excluded for further 
examination, as this group migrated to the Netherlands prior to the 2004 and 2007 
enlargement rounds. The other groups migrated because of their countries’ accession - or 
plans to accede to the EU - and became thus entitled to the rights of free movement within the 
EU.     
                                                          
67 In Dutch: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. This governmental institution gathers statistical information on 
the Netherlands. 
68 House of Representatives (the Netherlands)., ‘Eindrapport – Arbeidsmigratie in goede banen, Tijdelijke 
commissie lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie’, Parliamentary inquiry, Vol. 32680, No. 4, pp. 34, 2011. 
69 Snel, E, M. Faber, G. Engbersen.,’Maatschappelijke positie van Midden- en Oost-Europese 
arbeidsmigranten’, in: Justitiële Verkenningen, Vol. 6, pp. 61-62, 2013. 
70 van der Heijden, P.G.M, M. Cruyff, G. van Gils., ‘Aantallen geregistreerde en niet-geregistreerde burgers uit 
MOE-landen die in Nederland verblijven – Rapportage schattingen 2009 en 2010’, Utrecht University, pp. 9-10, 
2013. 
71 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek., ‘Eerste- en tweedegeneratieallochtonen uit Midden-, Oost- en Zuid-
Europa die ingeschreven staan in de GBA, naar geslacht, herkomstgroepering en woongemeente, 1-1-2015’, 
Centrum voor Beleidsstatistiek, June 2015. 
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 This leads to a group of ten, which can be distinguished along the number of people 
residing in the Netherlands. There are four main countries whose citizens form the largest 
groups: Bulgarians (23.310), Hungarians (21.105), Poles (137.775) and Romanians (21.050). 
The remaining countries have significantly fewer citizens living in the Netherlands, due to 
their relatively smaller populations. From highest to lowest these are: Lithuania (5.425), 
Latvia (3.980), Estonia (1.345), the Czech Republic72 (660), Slovakia (575) and Slovenia 
(255).            
 While there are four countries with the highest absolute numbers of citizens living in 
the Netherlands, this paper opts for Bulgarian, Poles and Romanians (‘BRP-‘) as the main 
research subjects and does not include Hungarians. The reason behind this is two-fold: firstly, 
a many Hungarians went to the Netherlands decades before Hungary joined the EU, due to 
political oppression in Hungary.73 Thus, while there are relatively many Hungarians in the 
Netherlands, they fall outside of the scope of this paper. Secondly, most of the domestic 
controversy surrounding CEE-migration focusses primarily on Bulgarians74, Poles75, or 
Romanians76. Another reason in choosing Bulgarian, Polish and Romanian citizens can be 
seen when filtering the CBS data along those born in the Netherlands, and those born in their 
respective country of origin. When this is done, Bulgarians, Poles and Romanians form the 
largest groups of CEE-migrants, respectively with: 20.025, 107.885 and 16.200 citizens.  
 On 1 January 2015, the total amount of the ‘first-generation’ CEE-citizens in the 
Netherlands was 176.705. Moreover, 53.800 persons who were born in the Netherlands had 
at least one CEE-parent: the so-called ‘second-generation’ group. For this purpose of this 
paper the ‘first-generation’-group will be highlighted, as this is made up with CEE-workers 
who migrated to the Netherlands. The ‘second-generation’-group are predominantly children 
and young adolescents and (partially) fall outside of the research scope, as they were born in 
the Netherlands.  
 
                                                          
72 The Czech Republic forms the exception, as its population size is greater than Bulgaria and Hungary. 
However, the amount of Czech citizens living in the Netherlands is small. 
73 Razenberg, I. B. Noordhuizen, M. de Gruijter., ‘Recente EU-migranten uit Midden-, Oost- en Zuid-Europa 
aan het woord, Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving, pp. 8-9, 2015. 
74 RTL Nieuws., ‘Grootschalige fraude Bulgaren met toeslagen’, 21 April 2013, 
www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/grootschalige-fraude-bulgaren-met-toeslagen 
75 De Stentor., ‘Drinkende Polen veroorzaken overlast winkelcentrum Kayershof Apeldoorn’, 27 January 2016, 
www.destentor.nl/nieuws/drinkende-polen-veroorzaken-overlast-winkelcentrum-kayershof-
apeldoorn~ace4900e1/ 
76 Metro., ‘Roemenen zijn negatief imago meer dan zat’, 20 January 2012, 
www.metronieuws.nl/nieuws/2012/01/roemenen-zijn-negatief-imago-meer-dan-zat 
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 What can be stated without a doubt is that the actual number of CEE-migrants 
residing in the Netherlands is significantly higher than what was expected prior to the 2004 
and 2007 accession rounds.77 It was predicted that from 2004 onwards an annual influx 
between 4.000-8.000 CEE-migrants would take place, and that after 2015 this would increase 
to 10.000 per year. These projections would have led to 42.000-56.000 CEE-migrants in 2011 
in the Netherlands. However, in 2011 it was estimated that 200.000 CEE-migrants were 
present.78          
 Interestingly, the gender distribution of CEE-migrants is relatively even. In fact, there 
are 10% more female CEE-migrants than males. Of the 230.500 CEE-citizens living in the 
Netherlands in 2015, 121.300 were male and 133.605 female: 47,6% versus 52,4%. This high 
figure of female migrants is a novelty in the history of labour migration to the Netherlands, as 
previous migration waves were predominantly male.79 Romanian migrants have the largest 
difference in the ratio between males and females, as there were 6.315 males versus 9.885 
females, meaning that there are 56,5% more Romanian females registered at the CBS than 
males.  A possible explanation could be that females are more likely to register due to family 
reunification or through marriage with a Dutch citizen.80 Additionally, females tend to have 
not have short-term occupations, requiring or stimulating registration.81 Males, on the other 
hand, are likely to migrate alone and are more active in temporary occupations.8283 
 The CBS data corroborates with academic work (Weltevrede, et al. 2009; van der 
Heijden, et al. 2013; Engbersen, et al. 2014) where it is stated that many CEE-migrants do not 
register and that the actual number of CEE-migrants is significantly higher: possibly two or 
three times as high. Additionally, the group of non-registered CEE-citizens is unclear: living 
(temporary) in the Netherlands, but not registered at a municipality, or registered in another 
                                                          
77 de Jong, A., ‘Bevolkingsprognose 2004-2050: veronderstellingen’, CBS Bevolkingstrends 2e kwartaal 2005, 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), Voorburg/Heerlen, pp. 19-23, 2005. 
78 House of Representatives (the Netherlands)., ‘Eindrapport – Arbeidsmigratie in goede banen, Tijdelijke 
commissie lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie’, Parliamentary inquiry, Vol. 32680, No. 4, pp. 41-42, 2011. 
79 Snel, E. M. Faber, G. Engbersen., ‘Maatschappelijke positie van Midden- en Oost-Europese 
arbeidsmigranten’, in: Justitiële Verkenningen, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 63, 2013. 
80 Luthra, R.R, L. Platt, J. Salamonska., ‘Migrant diversity, migration motivations and early integration: the case 
of Poles in Germany, the Netherlands, London and Dublin’, in: Institute for Social & Economic Research, Vol. 
2014-18, pp. 14-15, 2014. 
81 Corpeleijn, A., ‘Migranten en werknemers uit de Oost-Europese lidstaten van de Europese Unie’, in: CBS 
Bevolkingstrends 3e kwartaal, pp. 35, 2009. 
82 Sociaal-Economische Raad., ‘Arbeidsmigratie ‘, Commissie Arbeidsmigratie (CA), Vol. 14, No. 9, pp. 28, 
2014, The Hague. 
83 Engbersen, G. M. Lies, A. Leerkes, E. Snel, R. van der Meij., ‘Arbeidsmigratie in vieren – Bulgaren en 
Roemenen vergeleken met Polen’, Erasmus University Rotterdam, pp. 47, 2011. 
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member state but residing in the Netherlands.84 Additionally, CEE-migrants might not be 
familiar with Dutch registration practises, as this differ from the member state of origin. 
When a CEE-migrant does not understand Dutch and is not informed by the employment 
agency or employer - or sceptical of authorities all together - this provides further hurdles.85
 In a 2015 survey amongst 161 Dutch municipalities, a majority stated they lacked 
sufficient information: 81% of the municipalities had (very) limited knowledge of 
unregistered CEE-migrants. When it comes to registered CEE-migrants, 40% of 
municipalities had (very) limited knowledge. Furthermore, in terms of housing- and labour 
situations this obscurity also applies: 46% had (very) extensive knowledge of housing 
situations, while 30% had such (extensive) knowledge in the labour situation of CEE-
migrants. Despite the unclarity, municipalities do not actively gather information: a quarter of 
the municipalities investigated the living conditions of CEE-migrants. Subsequently, almost 
two-thirds of the municipalities do not have specific policies aimed at CEE-migrants.86  
 It is also noted that for both CEE-migrants and municipalities there is no incentive to 
register. For CEE-migrants, registration would mean they will be taxed by municipalities; for 
instance: waste collection levies and sewage charges. For municipalities, registration of CEE-
migrants means a decline in tourist tax revenues. Finally, municipalities are burdened by 
administrative processes of (de-)registering CEE-migrants, requiring many formalities which 
may take up to fourteen weeks.87       
 Apart from the numbers on the total number of CEE-migrants living in the 
Netherlands, it is also relevant to look at their geographical distribution. As the CBS data 
shows, there are certain places high shares of either Bulgarians, Poles or Romanians. Such 
areas will most likely have the highest share of social problems by these groups and likely to 
have information and certain policies.88       
 The three biggest cities in the Netherlands – Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague – 
have the highest numbers of registered CEE-migrants. When looking solely at the CBS data 
                                                          
84 de Boom, J. Y. Seidler, A.M. Weltevrede., ‘Criminaliteit onder Midden- en Oost-Europeanen – Een 
inventariserend onderzoek naar de omvang en aard van de criminaliteit onder migranten uit de Midden- en Oost-
Europese EU-landen’, Erasmus University Rotterdam/Risbo, pp. 47, 2014. 
85 Razenberg, I. B. Noordhuizen, M. de Gruijter., ‘Recente EU-migranten uit Midden-, en Oost- en Zuid-Europa 
aan het woord, pp. 18-20, 2015. 
86 de Gruijter, M. I. Razenberg., ‘Enquête gemeenten & EU-migranten’, Kennisplatform Integratie & 
Samenleving / Verwey-Jonker Instituut, pp. 1-8, 2015. 
87 House of Representatives (the Netherlands)., ‘Eindrapport – Arbeidsmigratie in goede banen, Tijdelijke 
commissie lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie’, Parliamentary inquiry, Vol. 32680, No. 4, pp. 34-35, 2011. 
88 van Gestel, B. E.K. van Straalen, M.A. Verhoeven., ‘Marginaal gehuisveste arbeidsmigranten en overlast’, in: 
Justitiële Verkenningen, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 88-89, 2013. 
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on CEE-citizens that migrated to the Netherlands – the ‘first generation’- The Hague (18.425) 
has the most CEE-migrants, followed by Amsterdam (12.020) and Rotterdam (11.915). In 
total, including the second generation, the three biggest cities remain ranked in the same 
manner: The Hague (21.790), Amsterdam (15.345) and Rotterdam (14.400).   
 There are certain places with relatively high rates of CEE-citizens. For instance, 
Zaanstad (570) and Schiedam (560) have many Bulgarians; Westland (3.635) ranks third in 
the amount of Poles and has more than Amsterdam (3.415); and while Romanians forms the 
smallest group of the three, in Eindhoven there are more Romanians (475) than Bulgarians 
(455). The presence of a ‘network of migrants’ may explain such areas with high 
concentrations. This reasoning builds on the notion that migrants are attracted to certain 
locations with concentrations of the same ethnicity.89 Such concentrations form networks, 
attracting and facilitating migration.90        
 An interesting case is that of Westland, which has many Poles, as opposed to very few 
Bulgarians and Romanians. The Westland region is known as a horticulture centre, 
predominantly based on growing vegetables, fruits and plants in greenhouses. As the CBS 
data shows, there were 3.635 Poles in Westland, while only 55 Bulgarians and 50 Romanians 
were registered. In fact, it appears that Poles are perhaps more willing to work in horticulture 
and agriculture than Bulgarians and Romanians. A contributing factor could be that certain 
employment agencies focus on finding employment for certain CEE-groups. This then leads 
to the assumption that there are differences amongst the preference of BRP-workers in labour 
occupations.91 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89 Engbersen, G. M. Lies, A. Leerkes, E. Snel, R. van der Meij., ‘Arbeidsmigratie in vieren – Bulgaren en 
Roemenen vergeleken met Polen’, Erasmus University Rotterdam, pp. 27-31, 2011. 
90 Josifidis, K. N. Supic, E.B. Pucar, S. Srdic., ‘Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs EU-15’, in: Journal of 
Business Economics and Management’, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 52-54, 2014  
91 Engbersen, G. M. Lies, A. Leerkes, E. Snel, R. van der Meij., ‘Arbeidsmigratie in vieren – Bulgaren en 
Roemenen vergeleken met Polen’, Erasmus University Rotterdam, pp. 10, 38-41, 2011. 
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   Labour Exploitation or Opportunity? 
 
This chapter will examine the labour status of CEE-workers in the Netherlands and its effect 
on their social situation. While this work primarily looks at the social situation of CEE-
workers, a partial economic perspective is necessary because most CEE-migrants arrived 
with the to (find) work. Moreover, such economic activity is intrinsically linked to housing- 
and living conditions. Therefore, it is important to highlight the negative aspects of the labour 
situation of CEE-migrants in the Netherlands.      
 There are two main works used in this chapter, both originating from the inspection of 
the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and formed the most recent rapports at 
the time of writing: the ‘Year Plan 2015’ and ‘Yearly Report 2015’. The ‘Year Report 2015’ 
opened with the statement that even though the Dutch economy experienced growth, this did 
not lead to increased wages and better labour conditions for workers. This notion applied 
particularly to those at the bottom segment of the labour market.92 In that regard this is highly 
relevant for this study, as it confirms that CEE-migrant workers are predominantly active in 
low-skilled occupations; despite high educational obtainments.939495   
 The inspection saw great risk in what it described as ‘labour exploitation’, meaning 
that workers face underpayment and other detrimental labour conditions, such as long 
working hours.96 Regarding labour exploitation, workers often face bad and even dangerous 
conditions on the work floor, but also in housing- and living situations.97 The aspect of 
underpayment is also mentioned, effecting not just the income of CEE-workers but also 
distorts competition on the labour market.98 Subsequently, this may lead to unemployment of 
native workers or a reduced income.99       
                                                          
92 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment., ‘Jaarverslag 2015’, Inspection Social Affairs and Employment, 
pp. 11, 2015. 
93 Kahanec, M., ‘Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union’, in: World Bank Social Protection & 
Labor Discussion Paper, no. 1301, pp. 10-18, 2013. 
94 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment., ‘Monitor Arbeidsmarkt – Oktober 2014’, pp. 10, 2014. 
95 Landesmann, M, S.M. Leitner, S. Jestl., ‘Migrants and Natives in EU Labour Markets: Mobility and Job-Skill 
Mismatch Patterns’, in: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) Research Report, No. 
403, pp. 1-48, 2015. 
96 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment., ‘Jaarverslag 2015’, Inspection Social Affairs and Employment, 
pp. 12-13, 2015. 
97 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment., ‘Jaarplan 2015’, Inspection Social Affairs and Employment, pp. 
32, 2014. 
98 Afonso, A., ‘Employer strategies, cross-class coalitions and the free movement of labour in the enlarged 
European Union’, in: Socio-Economic Review, pp. 1-26, 2012. 
99 Blanchflower, D.G, C. Shadforth., ‘Fear, Unemployment and Migration’, in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 
119, No. 535, pp. 136-182, 2009. 
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 A factor which directly affects an underpaid worker is – unsurprisingly - that they 
may not receive a sufficient degree of income. Subsequently, such a worker may be prone to 
poverty. To illustrate, the income level may not be sufficient to provide for several (essential) 
features, such as: adequate living conditions, starting a family or in leisure activities.100  
 It is, however, important to note that this concept of exploitation must be properly 
understood. On the one hand, there are Dutch labour standards and regulations. On the other 
hand, CEE-workers may not be aware of such legislation and thus ‘accept’ exploitative 
employment terms and conditions.101 Yet, the inspection also states that CEE-workers often 
consciously accept exploitative conditions.102 As Dutch wages and social benefits are higher 
than that of the CEE-member states, this incentivizes acceptance.103104 Therefore, CEE-
workers may not experience exploitation and, in fact, appear willing as the income outweighs 
aspects of exploitation. Furthermore, this reduces the likelihood and incentive to report 
wrongdoings. This willingness and the large (potential) supply of CEE-workers can be 
lucrative for both Dutch employers and employment agencies focussed on CEE-workers. 
 Another important aspect is that of fake posted workers and self-employed persons. 
Such bogus constructions are used by CEE-migrants to pose as cheap labour, for instance by 
charging different rates and by circumventing legislation. This threatens the income- and 
employment levels of native workers, as it forms unfair competition.105 While CEE-workers 
may conscientiously opt for such constructs, this does leave them exposed to certain risks. 
For instance, by working at reduced wages this may not be sufficient income to provide for 
one’s livelihood and by circumventing national labour- and social legislation it could exclude 
entitlement to social benefits.106 Apart from bogus constructions, actual posted workers were 
also often insufficiently aware of their rights and obligations.107    
                                                          
100 Dobson, J.R, I. Sennikova., ‘From fundamental freedom to policy and economic ‘hot potato’ in 50 years: 
Labour mobility and migration within the EU’, in: Journal of Business Economics and Management, Vol. 8, No. 
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103 Josifidis, K, N. Supic, E.B. Pucar, S. Srdic., ‘Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs EU-15’, in: Journal of 
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106 Baas, T., ‘The Macroeconomic Impact of Intra-EU Migration on the German Economy’, in: Intereconomics, 
Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 142, 2014. 
107 Engbersen, G, M. Lies, A. Leerkes, E. Snel, R. van der Meij., ‘Arbeidsmigratie in vieren – Bulgaren en 
Roemenen vergeleken met Polen’, Erasmus University Rotterdam, pp. 11-19, 2011. 
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 It is demonstrated that there is a lack of monitoring and enforcement of (bogus) 
posted- and self-employed workers by the inspection.108 The ability of the inspection to 
investigate these constructions is also hindered by the necessity to receive information from 
the member state of origin. Regardless, investigations are important, as such (bogus) 
constructions circumvent national legislation and cause distortions on the labour market.109
 Addressing exploitation also threaten CEE-workers, as notifying authorities may 
result in losing income and housing accommodations. In such events, CEE-migrants might 
see no other way but to return to the member state of origin; an undesirable scenario. This 
also highlights the difficulty in investigating labour exploitation: neither employer, employee 
nor employment agencies benefit from reporting wrongdoings. Subsequently, labour 
exploitation remains difficult to prove, as the inspection strongly relies on notifications.110
 In the case of housing- and living conditions, this refers to overcrowdings and risks 
due to inadequate electrical wiring and ventilation. Moreover, CEE-workers may be bound by 
a contract to live and work at the same premises: loss of employment means losing housing. 
Rent for housing may also be deduced from a worker’s salary, meaning that the entitled 
income is not received. Additionally, by being tied to such contracts hinders the possibility to 
find another job. Finally, these aspects place CEE-workers in a vulnerable position to address 
employment terms and conditions. Such a position may apply to significant amounts of CEE-
workers, as a 2011 study demonstrated that all respondents stated that they received housing 
through their employer.111         
 Employment agencies play a significant part in facilitating employment for CEE-
workers. In fact, employment agencies provide employment most Polish workers – the largest 
group of CEE-workers - in the Netherlands.112 In that sense, malicious employment agencies 
are of importance as they contribute to labour exploitation. A parliamentary research 
commission discovered that there were over five thousand malicious employment agencies 
serving over one hundred thousand CEE-workers, indicating that significant amounts of 
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CEE-workers were (at risk of) being exploited.113 The commission was “shocked” by these 
figures and even stated that self-regulation of employment agencies in facilitating intra-EU 
labour migration had “failed”.         
  A more recent study in 2016 revealed that Polish workers remain subject to 
labour exploitation, due to the strong dependency on malicious employment agencies.114 The 
organisations behind the study – FairWork and SOMO - stated that several thousands of 
malicious employment agencies remain and that the Dutch government’s policy of self-
regulation within the field of employment agencies must be revamped. The organisation 
continues to receive several hundred notifications of labour exploitation of CEE-workers 
each year.115            
 There are also cultural factors linked to issues of labour, such as insufficient language 
skills. Some of these problems are in terms of safety (not able to understand safety 
instructions)116, increased risk of unemployment and the risk of exploitation.117 Language 
barriers also hinder investigations by the inspection. As CEE-workers generally do not speak 
or understand Dutch (or not adequately enough), the inspection may require interpreters. In 
fact, studies shown that CEE-migrants often lack adequate language skills in both English 
and German.118 Another factor is the general sense of distrusting authorities, which reduce 
the number of notifications.119 Furthermore, it was found that CEE-workers were instructed 
by their employer or employment agency to give certain answers during questioning.120  To 
conclude: it is rather difficult for the inspection to investigate and combat the labour 
exploitation of CEE-migrants.       
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            Welfare (Tourism) 
 
This chapter will be on the degree of integration of CEE-migrants in the Netherlands. The 
CBS defines integration as “the process in which immigrant groups and the native population 
grow towards each other and fully participate within Dutch society”.121 Such process refers to 
several aspects, such as: language skills, contact with the native population, living conditions, 
welfare and social assistance recipients and labour participation, the position of CEE-
children, intended duration of stay, et cetera. In that sense, it is also important to compare the 
CEE-migrant group to other ethnic groups. The main source for this chapter is the 
‘Jaarrapport Integratie 2014’122 and its appendix123, a yearly report of the CBS on the 
integration of non-Dutch groups within Dutch society. At the time of writing the report on 
2015 was not yet available.         
 Two aspects – labour participation and housing- and living conditions – have been 
mentioned in the previous sections of this work. Several aspects of integration will be 
highlighted because they signify the success – or failure – of CEE-migrants within Dutch 
society. In that regard, the ratio in receiving welfare and other social assistance programs will 
be examined; as this is generally considered as an indication of integration. Moreover, there 
was controversy surrounding social assistance fraud committed by CEE-citizens.124 Limited 
attention will be given to language skills and family reunification, as these factors indicate 
the intended duration of stay. Language skills will be mentioned in the final chapter, when it 
comes to municipalities and their dealings with CEE-migrants.    
 If a CEE-migrant learns Dutch (e.g. by interaction with native Dutch friends and 
colleagues or language courses) and brings family over, then this to indicates (semi-) 
permanent residence.125 If, however, a CEE-migrant does not bring family over this signifies 
a short duration of stay. In such case there is less incentive to (fully) integrate, meaning that 
there will be no emphasis on learning the language and cultural values and that most contact  
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will be with persons of similar ethnicity. Studies (Engbersen et. al), 2011; Razenberg, 
Noordhuizen & de Gruijter, 2015) already demonstrated that CEE-migrants socialize with 
persons of the same ethnicity and that most do not speak (any) Dutch. Additionally, studies 
found that CEE-children are severely affected by lacking Dutch language skills (including 
when parents lack this), as this leads to poor results, demotivation and discontinuing 
education.126 However, CEE-migrants cannot be obliged to learn Dutch, as this goes against 
EU law.127           
 A key distinction within the theory on migration – especially intra-EU migration – is 
economic128 versus welfare migration129.130 Prior to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements rounds, 
the ‘old EU’-member states feared that CEE-migrants might take advantage of social 
benefits, as these were relatively high and easily accessible.131132 Such fear is believed to be 
the main source of discrimination, as indicated by 80% of CEE-respondents.133 In that regard 
it is important to examine the share of CEE-migrants in receiving social assistance programs.
 The CBS data shows that CEE-migrants had a relatively low share in welfare benefits 
recipients: 2,7% of all CEE-migrants. Within the different groups of CEE-migrants it can be 
stated that Poles had the lowest share (2,2%), while Bulgarians had the highest (3,7%). Of the 
Romanians living in the Netherlands 3,2% received welfare benefits.134 When compared to 
the rate of the native Dutch population (2,1%) CEE-migrants are relatively similar, albeit 
higher by 0,6%. When compared to other non-ethnic Dutch groups CEE-migrants had a much 
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129 Razin, A., ‘MIGRATION into the WELFARE STATE: tax and migration competition’ in: International Tax 
Public Finanace, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 538-563, 2013. 
130 Josifidis, K, N. Supic, E.B. Pucar, S. Srdic., ‘Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs EU-15’, in: Journal of 
Business Economics and Management’, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 43-44, 2014. 
131 Elsner, B., ‘Does emigration benefit the stayers? Evidence from EU enlargement’, in: Journal of Popular 
Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 533-534, 2013. 
132 Barslund, M, M. Busse., ‘Too much or Too Little Labour Mobility? Sate of Play and Policy Issues’, in: 
Intereconomics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 116, 2014. 
133 Dekker, P. J. den Ridder, P. van Houwelingen., ‘Burgerperspectieven Kwartaalbericht 2013 | 4’, in: Continu 
Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, pp. 47, The Hague, 2013. 
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lower share, as 33,8%135 of non-Western refugees136 and 12,8%137 of non-Western 
foreigners138 received welfare benefits. Therefore, it can be safely stated that the stereotype of 
CEE-migrants as welfare tourists can be refuted, as this would require higher rates. 
 However, there is a noticeable trend: the longer a CEE-migrant resides in the 
Netherlands, the more likely it is to receive social assistance. To illustrate, of the group of 
CEE-migrants aged 0-3 years only 0,8% received welfare, while this share goes up to 6,4% 
when residing for 9 years and longer. 2,4% of CEE-migrants living between 3 to 6 years 
received welfare, an increase of 3 times compared to newly (0-3 years) arrived CEE-
migrants.139 The explanation for this link between duration of stay and the likelihood to 
receive welfare benefits may be that CEE-migrants have trouble finding a new job, possibly 
due to lacking language skills.140        
 Furthermore, the number of disabled CEE-migrants that cannot participate in labour 
activities is relatively low. The share of CEE-migrants receiving disability benefits was 
1,3%141, while the disabled native Dutch population had a share of 6,9% and non-Western 
foreigners comprised 7,2%.142 Finally, the share of non-Western refugees receiving disability 
benefits was 3,4%. This low share of the CEE-migrants serves as an argument that disabled 
CEE-citizens did not migrate to the Netherlands with the intent to receive ‘generous’ welfare 
and other social assistance benefits. Instead, the low figure is more likely to refer to CEE-
migrants that suffered a work-related injury or by other circumstances.  
 Finally, there is one type of social assistance where CEE-migrants did have a higher 
share than the other ethnic groups: unemployment benefits. Yet, this serves as evidence that 
CEE-migrants were not welfare tourists, as to receive unemployment benefits the recipient 
must have worked in the first place. When it comes to the share of CEE-migrants (4,6%)143 
receiving unemployment benefits, this was higher than the native Dutch population (3,5%) 
and that of non-Western foreigners (3,9%).144 Although the rate of CEE-migrants receiving 
unemployment benefits was not significantly higher than the other groups, the most likely 
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reason behind this is that most CEE-migrants were active in low-skilled occupations. 
Working in low-skilled jobs has a higher risk of unemployment and for CEE-migrants it may 
be more difficult to find work.        
 A common notion is that the higher the educational level, the more likely it is find 
employment. This notion is seen when looking at the labour participation rate of CEE-
migrants in the Netherlands along educational levels. 46% of CEE-migrants with low 
educational levels had employment, while 69% of those in the middle levels had so. For the 
CEE-migrants with higher education (professional education or university) the labour 
participation rate is the highest with 77%. Despite these high labour participation rates along 
educational levels, when compared to other foreign groups the native Dutch population has 
the highest rates; regardless of educational levels.145 Still, these figures do not mention 
whether such employment matches educational levels.    
 Besides the share of social assistance recipients, it is important to also investigate the 
unemployment levels of CEE-migrants. It is worth noting that CEE-migrants rank only 
behind the native Dutch population: 7% compared to 10%. Compared to other ethnic groups 
CEE-migrants have half the unemployment levels, as that share is 19%. However, and in 
stark contrast to all other groups, CEE-women are twice as often unemployment than CEE-
males: 13% versus 6%. However, this rate remains relatively low, as non-Western foreign 
females had 18%. In fact, CEE-males have the lowest unemployment rate within the 
Netherlands. The native Dutch male population has an unemployment rate of 7%, while non-
Western foreign males were at almost 20%.146       
 An additional distinction can be made when examining the relative low 
unemployment rates of CEE-migrants: age. It can be stated that up to the age of 25 CEE-
migrants are rarely unemployed. This is explained by the fact that this group is studying or 
that CEE-migrants tend to migrate above the age of 25. The second age group of CEE-
migrants – aged 25 to 45 – had lower unemployed levels than those aged between 45 to 65, 
although the difference is marginal: 9% and 10%. Although the levels of CEE-migrants are 
like that of the native Dutch population age groups, non-Western foreigners are between two 
to three times more often unemployed. In general, it can safely be stated that CEE-migrants 
perform quite well, as most were able to find work and the low share in social assistance 
recipients; overall positively contributing to Dutch society. An explanation might be that 
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most CEE-migrants arrived with the prospect of employment. Thus, it seems that the biggest 
risk factor for CEE-migrants to receive welfare benefits is loss of employment and that this 
group has difficulty in finding new employment.      
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         Crime and Nuisance 
 
The following section will be on the crime participation and nuisance caused of CEE-
migrants in the Netherlands. As Dutch media coverage (post-accession examples147148149) 
influenced the perception within parts of Dutch society that CEE-migrants are actively 
involved in criminal activities, it is necessary to investigate this claim. This criminal 
stereotype was also stimulated by scholars who used media outlets to state that CEE-citizens 
had rising crime rates.150 Such perception on CEE-career criminals may easily be used to 
portray the entire group of CEE-migrants, especially by those sceptical of intra-EU (labour) 
mobility.151 Furthermore, nuisance will also be highlighted, as such aspects – alcohol or drug 
abuse and homelessness– lead to disturbances in the quality of life within neighbourhoods.152 
While not necessarily linked to criminal activities, such practices could pose as a stepping 
stone or be the result of this.         
 It is important to examine to what extend the crime participation of CEE-migrants 
differ from the native Dutch population, as well as other ethnic groups. As most CEE-
migrants arrived with the intend to work, the stereotype of CEE-migrants with the intend to 
commit crime can be refuted. However, CEE-migrants may also end up performing criminal 
activities or have other run-ins with the law. Moreover, as can be seen in the other sections of 
this work, CEE-migrants do not form a distinct group. Instead, it is likely that there will be 
differences amongst the respective CEE-groups. Additionally, there may be differences in the 
types of crime committed by certain CEE-groups.        
 To illustrate the public perception: in a study done by the ‘Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research’153, more than half of the Dutch respondents believed that CEE-migrants 
caused nuisance and that they arrived to commit crime. Moreover, increased nuisance and  
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crime rates formed the second most mentioned aspect of CEE-migrants. While differences in 
income, wealth and economic development posed as one of the main reasons for CEE-
workers to migrate to the Netherlands, this same argument was also used to claim that CEE-
criminals would shift their attention to Western Europe.154      
 The association between CEE-citizens and crime is perhaps understandable, as the 
Netherlands saw a sharp increase of CEE-criminal activities in the 1990s. Studies (de Boom, 
Seidler & Weltevrede, 2014) mentioned two types of crime committed by CEE-citizens in the 
Netherlands: mobile criminal gangs, referred to as ‘mobile banditism’155, and illegal work. In 
fact, mobile banditism forms the main type of criminal activity performed by CEE-criminals. 
In part, this is because the EU-enlargement rounds resulted in more travel possibilities for 
CEE-criminals, along with the ease to transport stolen goods – predominantly cars – back to 
the member state of origin.156 Furthermore, the cross-border element makes it more difficult 
for law enforcement to effectively combat criminal activities. Finally, it is claimed that the 
EU’s institutions and ‘old’ member states did not do enough to prevent an influx of CEE-
criminals and failed to ensure that the candidate member states would combat crime.157158 
 Apart from the abovementioned types of crime - predominantly performed by career 
criminals - there is another category as well. This category is formed by CEE-migrants who 
arrived in a destination member state with the intention to work, but have resorted to (petty) 
crime to stay alive: ‘survival crime’.159 CEE-migrants falling performing survival crime did 
so predominantly due to (the fear of) job loss.160 A key factor in survival crime is a network 
of fellow countrymen. Such network provides social contacts that may aid (unemployed) 
CEE-migrants. If a CEE-migrant has its social contacts located in the country of origin, then 
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this contributes to ‘survival crime’.161       
 When investigating the data of the CBS162163, it can be noted that between 2005 to 
2011 there was a stable rate of CEE-suspects. In contrast to all other CEE-suspects, 
Bulgarians experienced an increase over the years in their overall share of suspects: from 
1,5% in 2005 to almost 3% in 2013.  Poles, Romanians and other CEE-suspects had a share 
of 1,5% in 2005, which went up to 2% but returned to 1,5% in 2013.164 To further illustrate 
the limited share of CEE-citizens, while Bulgarians formed the only CEE-group that 
increased over the years and ultimately formed the largest group, their share remains under 
that of non-Western suspects.        
 When looking at the age distribution of the CEE-suspects, most (3,6%) were between 
the ages of 12 to 18, followed by those aged 18 to 25 with 2,1%. CEE-suspects aged 25 to 45 
had a share of 1,7%, while those above the age of 45 only had a share of 0,9%.165 That young 
CEE-suspects form the largest group is not entirely surprising, as previous studies 
demonstrated similar findings. However, such studies did state that despite the relatively 
large share of young CEE-suspects, this share should be viewed within the context of 
difficulties adjusting into Dutch society: a call for help and attention, rather than criminal 
behaviour.166           
 Apart from the CBS data there is another study167 on criminal activities by CEE-
citizens in the Netherlands, forming the most recent and comprehensive overview at the time 
of writing. To start off, the assumption that CEE-migrants are likely to not be registered at 
municipalities can be seen. In fact, the study shows that 30% of CEE-suspects were 
registered, while 70% was not. Moreover, CEE-suspects were the only group likely to be not 
registered: 98,5% of native Dutch suspects; 92,4% for non-Western residents and other 
Western residents (72,4%) were registered.168 Subsequently, the low share of registered CEE-
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suspects indicates that these were CEE-labour migrants. This falls in line with other results 
stating that mostly CEE-career criminals performed crime, not CEE-labour migrants.169 
 However, the share of CEE-suspects increased ever since the accession of the CEE-
countries, while all other ethnicities experienced a decline. In 2012, 2% of registered CEE-
citizens were suspected of a crime, which is more than twice as high as the native Dutch 
share of 0,9%. Nevertheless, non-Western suspects formed 3,4%. When analysing the overall 
group of CEE-suspects into Bulgarian, Polish and Romanian shares, it is seen that Bulgarians 
form the largest group with 3%, followed by 2% for both Poles and Romanians.170 This data 
falls in line with the results of the CBS: CEE-suspects formed ~2%, which was lower than all 
other ethnic groups but higher than the 1% rate of native Dutch citizens.171 Regardless, the 
(prospect of) accession to the EU led to a sharp increase in the total number of CEE-suspects: 
from 1.412 in 1996 to 10.204 suspects in 2011.172 This is not entirely surprising, as the 
(prospect of) accession enabled CEE-citizens to travel and live in other member states. 
 When it comes to CEE-suspects and types of crime, it is noteworthy that a majority 
(55,6%) was related to property crime, such as: burglary, larceny, theft, counterfeit goods and 
money and embezzlement. In contrast, other ethnic groups had a 31% share in property 
crime. Property crime is the only type of crime where CEE-suspects had a higher share than 
the Dutch average. There are several notable types of crime where CEE-suspects had a 
significantly lower share than the Dutch average. For instance, CEE-suspects had a share of 
8,6% regarding violence related crime, while the other ethnic groups had 20,6%. CEE-
migrants cannot be linked to vandalism and public-order crime, as CEE-suspects had low 
shares. Finally, it may be remarked that CEE-suspects had lower participation rates in drugs 
related crime, as their share is almost twice as low than the total rate. Furthermore, for traffic 
offenses CEE-suspects comprised 15,8%, a lower rate than the average of 16,4%. However, 
75% of traffic offences with CEE-suspects were due to alcohol abuse. This indicates that the 
stereotypical ‘drunk CEE-driver’ occurs less than average, but that for this group alcohol 
abuse does account for most traffic offences.173     
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 However, the ‘drunk CEE-driver’ stereotype remains persistent, especially (excessive) 
alcohol consumption amongst Poles. To illustrate, studies indicated an apparent differences in 
‘alcohol culture’ between the CEE-countries and the Netherlands. For instance, respondents 
mentioned that intoxication in traffic and drinking during working hours were considered by 
Poles as normal behaviour.174 Additionally, this notion is substantiated by the limited 
enforcement against drunk driving in CEE-countries and that fines were not collected.175 
Finally, intoxication and language barriers were factors hindering police work when dealing 
with CEE-citizens.176         
 Within the Netherlands attention for nuisance caused by CEE-migrants rose to a 
noteworthy level in 2012, after the political party ‘PVV’ launched an online platform where 
citizens could place complaints: Meldpunt Midden en Oost Europeanen (‘Hotline Central and 
Eastern Europeans’). During the span of a year the hotline received over 40.000 complaints, 
of which 60% were related to nuisance caused by CEE-migrants.  Moreover, 16% of 
complaints related to the perception that CEE-migrants had ‘stolen’ jobs and housing 
accommodations, while only a small percentage referred to criminal activities; such as theft 
and burglary.177 While the hotline cannot be wholly representative, it did demonstrate that 
criminal activities were not a big concern. Instead, nuisance was considered as more 
problematic. Perhaps ironically, the hotline was viewed as demonstrating the success of CEE-
migrants’ integration; especially regarding Poles, as there were less complaints than expected 
and not as severe.178          
 The final aspect of nuisance is that of homelessness. A 2015 study found that a 
“substantial” share of homeless people were CEE-citizens: 16% in Utrecht and 28% in The 
Hague, with relatively high shares of Poles and Bulgarians.179 The explanation was that these 
CEE-migrants initially were employed, but lost their job. As found in previous sections of 
this work, job loss often leads to losing housing accommodations, especially when this is 
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provided by the employer. Furthermore, not being entitled to social benefits increases 
homelessness; especially for newly arrived migrants. Newly arrived migrants often lack a 
social network, as family and friends are situated in the country of origin. In that sense, CEE-
migrants are particularly vulnerable to homelessness due to economic factors, the presence of 
a social network and social benefits eligibility. Drugs and alcohol abuse or mental illnesses 
do not play a significant role for CEE-migrants in becoming homeless.180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
180 Snel, E. G. Engbersen, M. Lies, R. van der Meij, J. Hamberg., ‘De Schaduwzijden van de nieuwe 
arbeidsmigratie – Dakloosheid en overlast van Midden- en Oost-Europese arbeidsmigranten in Den Haag’, 
Erasmus University, pp. 6-7, 2011. 
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    Current State of Affairs 
 
The previous sections of this work were predominantly filled with data and information 
gathered over the last years. While efforts were made to ensure that the studies formed the 
most recent and relevant investigations at the time of writing, time does not stand still. 
Therefore, this chapter will be based on the input given by actors involved with CEE-
migrants. More specifically, civil servants of several municipalities were asked about their 
policies, information and dealings with CEE-migrants.      
 Municipalities with many CEE-migrants are more likely to experience ‘problems’ 
with this group. Additionally, most studies focus on CEE-migrants within the entire 
Netherlands, leading to unclarity on local level. This led to the selection of three 
municipalities, all containing large numbers of CEE-migrants: Amsterdam, The Hague and 
Westland. In that sense, this chapter will update the previous chapters of this work, meaning 
that most of the aspects mentioned in previous chapters, such as inter alia information on the 
number of CEE-migrants, their labour- and housing situation and integration will be 
examined through the input of local civil servants. By doing so this work contributes to gaps 
currently left open in the academic debate.       
 The difference with other studies is that these often relied on interviews with CEE-
migrants, which may raise questions regarding representativeness. To illustrate, the 
truthfulness of such interviewees has been questioned, as CEE-migrants were reluctant or 
refused to answer certain (sensitive) questions.181 Additionally, the method of interviewing 
CEE-migrants may be troubled by the limited number of participants, or the 
overrepresentation of certain CEE-groups. Therefore, this work opts for civil servants, as 
these actors have a broader understanding of the social situation of CEE-migrants within their 
municipality.           
 In line with the previous chapters of this work, the civil servants were asked about 
their knowledge on the number of CEE-citizens residing in their respective municipality. This 
was asked since studies182 indicated that municipalities strongly desire to be informed on the 
number of CEE-migrants. While the number of registered CEE-citizens were easily provided,  
                                                          
181 Snel, E, M. Faber, G. Engbersen., ‘Maatschappelijke positie van Midden- en Oost-Europese 
arbeidsmigranten’, in: Justitiële Verkenningen, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 67, 2013. 
182 De Gruijter, M, I. Razenberg., ‘Enquête gemeenten & EU-migranten’, Kennisplatform Integratie & 
Samenleving / Verwey-Jonker Instituut, pp. 1-18, 2015. 
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it was difficult to indicate non-registered CEE-citizens. The civil servant of Amsterdam was 
unable to give an estimation of the amount of non-registered CEE-citizens and stated that, 
generally, the number of non-registered CEE-migrants differ per municipality and amongst 
CEE-nationalities. Subsequently, by highlighting academic work the respondent estimated 
that almost half of the CEE-migrants in the Amsterdam were not registered. In contrast, the 
municipality of Westland gave concrete estimations: 200 during low season and up to 500 in 
high season. However, as Westland has 3500 registered CEE-citizens during low season and 
4000 in high season, the figures of 200 and 500 non-registered CEE-migrants fall short to the 
academic estimations of almost 50%.183 The respondent of The Hague referred to a website184 
listing demographic characteristics of all neighbourhoods. Unfortunately, the website does 
not distinguish amongst CEE-migrants. Thus, the civil servant of The Hague was unable to 
estimate the number of registered CEE-citizens; let alone the amount of non-registered CEE-
citizens. Instead, the civil servant referred to a study185 done by the Children’s Ombudsman 
of The Hague on non-registered CEE-children. While the study only mentioned the amount 
of non-registered CEE-children – which is minimal - it did cover other issues on CEE-
migrants that were not mentioned by the civil servant. In that sense, the report was used to fill 
in further questions left open by the civil servant.      
 Information on the number of CEE-migrants is important to all three respondents; 
particularly on the non-registered group. The Westland civil servant was highly confident in 
its figures of non-registered CEE-citizens and stated that the municipality had “sufficient and 
concrete” data on the total number of CEE-migrants and their (intended) duration of stay. 
Interestingly, non-registration does not hinder the municipality of Westland in forming 
policy, as it is expected that non-registered CEE-migrants will reside and work for a brief 
period. Amsterdam has a different view and is affected by non-registration. Firstly, non-
registration makes it difficult to determine where and how many CEE-migrants are present. 
Secondly, non-registration hinders the capacity to provide information and reach out to such 
CEE-migrants. As this group cannot be reached, Amsterdam worries that this may affect their 
participation within society, primarily by not attending Dutch language courses. This 
reasoning indicates that Amsterdam expects that CEE-citizens will reside within the 
                                                          
183 Answers on the number of CEE-citizens registered and non-registered in Westland: 3500 and 200 in low 
season, 4000 and 500 during high season. This forms a share of non-registered CEE-citizens of 5,8% during low 
season and 12,5% in high season. 
184 https://denhaag.buurtmonitor.nl/ 
185 van Alphen, B., ‘Geregistreerd of niet? – Een zoektocht naar Midden- en Oost-Europese kinderen in Den 
Haag’, Onderzoeksrapport Jeugdombudsman Den Haag, pp. 1-43, 2016. 
0935077 33  
municipality for longer periods, rather than the prevalence of short-term residency in 
Westland. This difference is unsurprising, as economic activity in Westland revolves around 
horticulture; a seasonal sector.       
 Currently, CEE-citizens residing in the Netherlands for a brief period are not obliged 
to register at municipalities. The civil servants were asked if they would prefer mandatory 
registration for CEE-citizens, irrespective of the residency period and that the intention to 
work constitute an obligation to register. Interestingly, the suggestion was positively 
received, albeit that there were some reservations. The main arguments in favour of 
mandatory registration were that it would contribute to a better, overall understanding on the 
residing CEE-population. In turn, more understanding makes it easier to monitor and reach 
out to CEE-citizens. The respondent of The Hague sufficed by stating that EU law prohibits 
such an obligation. Interestingly, the Children’s Ombudsman of The Hague quoted a 
spokesperson of the police who preferred that all non-Dutch citizens must register.186 
 However, as stated there were also reservations. Firstly, if mandatory registration 
would apply only to CEE-citizens, then this constitutes discrimination based on nationality. 
Secondly, such obligation might deter migration. Finally, problems in enforcing were 
expected: “how to deal with non-registering CEE-migrants?”. Hence, it appears that the 
municipalities accept the status quo of EU law prohibiting mandatory registration. Yet, it 
appears that – in theory - there is willingness to accept mandatory registration of CEE-
migrants.           
 The civil servants were also asked if there were specific policies. The three 
municipalities generally do not have this, although Amsterdam used to. This absence strongly 
indicates that CEE-citizens do not form a problematic group. CEE-policies in Amsterdam 
were abandoned several years ago, as it was used in the period following the accession 
rounds and the subsequent influx of CEE-migrants. Recently, however, Amsterdam started to 
focus again on CEE-migrants: gathering information on labour situations, health insurance 
coverage, education and, lastly, providing ‘welcoming-information’. The investigations are 
used to determine if further action is required. However, it does appear that for Amsterdam 
such issues are not (yet) of a pressing nature, meaning that it concerns a relatively small 
number of CEE-citizens.         
 From the other respondents flows that signals of wrongdoings are also received, but 
                                                          
186 van Alphen, B., ‘Geregistreerd of niet? – Een zoektocht naar Midden- en Oost-Europese kinderen in Den 
Haag’, Onderzoeksrapport Jeugdombudsman Den Haag, pp. 36-38, 2016. 
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that there is insufficient information to create or warrant policy. Westland indicates that there 
is “no necessity to establish separate, individual policy”, as the group of CEE-migrants do not 
have any significant or distinct problems; at least not more when compared to other ethnic 
groups. Moreover, as the CEE-migrants in Westland generally reside for a limited period and 
are mostly employed, reducing the likelihood of issues. The Hague is no different and has 
one specific policy, aimed towards homeless CEE-citizens or those facing homelessness: the 
‘Perspektywa’-project. This project facilitates (soon to be) homeless CEE-migrants in 
returning to their respective member state of origin.      
 A notion mentioned by all respondents is that of labour exploitation. As described in 
earlier sections of this work, CEE-migrants are prone to labour exploitation. This may be due 
to not knowing legislation and social rights, or even by the willingness to accept exploitation 
due to high levels of income. While it was stated that labour exploitation took the attitudes 
and actions differ per municipality. Interestingly, Westland does not see a role for itself in 
tackling (labour) exploitation. When signs of labour exploitation of CEE-migrants arrive, 
Westland forwards this to NGO’s187 and the inspection of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment. The primary aspects of labour exploitation in Westland revolve around labour 
conditions: underpayment, hazardous situations and long working hours. In contrast, 
Amsterdam experiences a wider range of labour exploitation of CEE-migrants: prostitution, 
human trafficking and labour exploitation in cleaning services and the tourist sector. It may 
also be noted that labour exploitation of CEE-migrants in Amsterdam is significantly more 
pressing than in Westland, leading the Amsterdam civil servant to state that they are dealing 
with “modern slavery”. Amsterdam established a special taskforce in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to combat labour exploitation of CEE-migrants. 
Moreover, Amsterdam actively cooperates with NGO’s188 to combat modern slavery, with 
some organisations focussing exclusively on CEE-migrants. For The Hague, labour 
exploitation of CEE-migrants appears relatively similar to that of Amsterdam, although the 
respondent could not provide data or characteristics. This lack of information is the reason 
behind current investigations in cooperation with two NGO’s: ‘Stichting FairWork’ and 
                                                          
187 SNCU, Stichting Naleving CAO voor Uitzendkrachten (Foundation on upholding collective labour 
agreements for temporary workers.). Its website is available in Dutch and Polish: http://www.sncu.nl 
188 Mentioned specifically by the respondent: ‘Stichting FairWork’, ‘FairWork Foundation’. An organisation 
which combats and prevents (forms of) modern slavery in the Netherlands. Website available in Dutch, English, 
Arabic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Spanish, French, Indonesian, Hungarian, Vietnamese, Ukrainian, Turkish, Tagalog, 
Russian, Romanian, Portuguese and Polish at: www.fairwork.nu 
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‘SHOP’189. While both NGO’s revolve around human trafficking - with FairWork also being 
active in Amsterdam – ‘SHOP’ specifically relates to prostitution. To conclude, both 
Amsterdam and The Hague acknowledged issues of labour exploitation but much is yet 
unknown, subsequently triggering investigations. However, it remains unclear whether this 
new orientation is due to a sudden rise of reports, the signals becoming more severe or an 
overall lack of information; perhaps even a combination of the above.   
 Apart from aspects of labour exploitation, living- and housing conditions form a 
critical issue in academic literature as well. As described in previous sections of this work, 
such poor conditions are often due to overcrowdings. Another element is housing facilitated 
by employers and employment agencies, as CEE-migrants may be reluctant to request 
improvements in their labour- and housing situation out of fear of losing residence or 
employment. Furthermore, overcrowded housing in combination with poor electrical wiring 
and inadequate ventilation can form a deadly combination.      
 In the city of Amsterdam, poor living- and housing conditions used to be present. 
However, the respondent indicated that over the last years the municipality has attempted to 
strictly enforce living- and housing conditions. Amsterdam did such enforcement in 
cooperation with housing cooperatives and the tourist sector, along with creating public 
awareness. It appears that the approach has been successful, as poor housing- and living 
conditions are not considered a significant problem anymore. However, illegal housing 
remains a problem and Amsterdam considers it a priority issue. In contrast, Westland did not 
receive indications of poor housing- and living conditions. The municipality attributes this to 
their method of registration and high registration rates. To illustrate, Westland maintains 
extensive communications with employers and other actors supplying housing 
accommodations to CEE-migrants. However, Westland did indicate that overcrowdings are 
“plentiful”. Interestingly, however, overcrowdings are not regarded by Westland as 
hazardous. Instead, it is viewed as problematic to the privacy of CEE-citizens, but the 
municipality does not enforce it. This is due to the recognition that one person per room is – 
generally - not affordable. Moreover, residence in Westland is usually only for a limited 
period. And lastly, the overall lack of available (affordable) housing makes its understandable 
for Westland that CEE-migrants live with many persons. Unfortunately, the respondent of 
The Hague was unable to provide information on the housing- and living situation of CEE-
                                                          
189 ‘Stichting Hulp en Opvang Prostitutie en Mensenhandel’, ‘Foundation Help and Shelter for Prostitution and 
Human Trafficking’. Website available in Bulgarian, German, Spanish, Hungarian, Dutch, Thai, Chinese and 
English at: https://www.shop-denhaag.nl/home/ 
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migrants. However, the Children’s Ombudsman of The Hague did signal that housing 
accommodations and living conditions form a “significant problem”.190    
 Another negative aspect commonly associated with CEE-migrants is the stereotypical 
“welfare tourist”. The respondents were asked if they preferred additional conditions for 
CEE-citizens to gain access to social assistance. Interestingly, the respondents had different 
views on such a restriction: Amsterdam was against, while Westland had a more positive 
stance. The civil servant of The Hague did not wish to elaborate on the matter and will not be 
included in this section, as she stated that EU law prohibits such a move. The main criticism 
of Amsterdam was that CEE-citizens would be discriminated, as other citizens remain 
unaffected. Moreover, even if all EU citizens face additional criteria in accessing social 
assistance the city of Amsterdam remains hesitant; as such a situation benefit native Dutch 
citizens and non-EU citizens. This approach it unlikely that Amsterdam will adjust its access 
to social assistance, even though EU-law allows restrictions.191 In contrast, the respondent of 
Westland accepts additional conditions in the access of CEE-citizens to social assistance, as 
this may counter “unwanted side effects” of intra-EU migration. However, while Westland 
acknowledged welfare tourism, it does not form a significant problem. The same applies to 
the other two municipalities. Such limited occurrence falls in line with scholarly work, but 
nonetheless welfare tourism forms the main reason for Westland’s acceptance of additional 
conditions.            
 The respondents were also asked on their municipalities’ dealings with CEE-citizens; 
more specifically in terms of language. As CEE-migrants tend to not speak Dutch, this 
hinders communication and the ability to provide information. Additionally, language 
barriers pose as a hurdle for CEE-citizens to approach authorities. Thus, the respondents were 
asked if they have information for CEE-citizens available digitally. To start off, The Hague 
and Westland had information on their website, while Amsterdam stated it is in the process of 
doing so. The Westland website has a separate section for CEE-citizens, available in Polish 
and English. The fact that Westland has an entire section in Polish is especially useful and 
efficient, as many Poles are present. The website also has links to NGO’s, which are available 
in CEE-languages. In contrast, the CEE-website of Amsterdam is almost entirely in Dutch, 
                                                          
190 van Alphen, B., ‘Geregistreerd of niet? – Een zoektocht naar Midden- en Oost-Europese kinderen in Den 
Haag’, Onderzoeksrapport Jeugdombudsman Den Haag, pp. 26,29, 2016. 
191 For recent case law by the Court of Justice, see, inter alia, C-333/13 Dano and C-67/14 Alimanovic. 
Exclusion of EU-nationals on the (sole) basis of nationality remains prohibited, although it is possible to set 
conditions based on, for instance, duration of stay, period of employment and degree of integration into the host 
society. 
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although the respondent indicated that more information will be made available in English 
and German. However, the Amsterdam respondent did state that the municipality has 
developed digital brochures – available in Bulgarian, Polish and Romanian – which will be 
uploaded soon.           
 The website of The Hague has sections devoted to CEE-citizens and the ‘Information 
Desk for EU Migrant Workers’ has a webpage as well. The information desk website forms 
the main webpage for CEE-migrants in need of information. Firstly, the website is only 
available in Dutch, English and - interestingly - French. Secondly, the website has multiple 
documents containing information relevant for CEE-migrants. Unfortunately, five out of six 
are only available in Dutch. The sixth brochure, ‘New to the Netherlands’, while available in 
various languages, is inaccessible. Instead, the website does refer to brochures at the 
information desk available in Polish, Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian and English. 
However, this information desk is open once per week.      
 It appears that the The Hague prefers to ‘outsource’ its dealings with CEE-citizens to 
NGO’s, as the respondent stated to actively fund such NGO’s; in particular the ‘Foundation 
The Hague and Central Europe’, IDHEM192. In contrast, IDHEM is available four times a 
week, at multiple locations and during different timeslots. Additionally, it offers the 
opportunity to consult telephonically in three193 languages. The last point of the respondent 
concerns the online portal ‘Sociale Kaart’. This website is a comprehensive guide relating to 
healthcare, living- and housing matters and the overall wellness of citizens in The Hague. 
Unfortunately, however, this website is accessible only in Dutch. Thus, without assistance, 
CEE-migrants may have trouble retrieving information from such websites. Conversely, the 
website of IDHEM has the option to be displayed in other languages: English, Dutch, 
Hungarian, Romanian and Polish.         
 Overall, it seems that Westland is actively displaying (adequate) information on their 
website, while Amsterdam and The Hague are taking steps into that direction. Yet, it does 
appear that municipalities often prefer to fund or cooperate with NGO’s in informing and 
assisting CEE-migrants. It remains important that municipalities do take effort in making 
their websites available in languages other than Dutch; and at the very least in English. In that 
regard Westland is highly efficient, as they created online content in Polish due to the 
disproportionate high numbers of Polish inhabitants. As several NGO’s have staff members 
                                                          
192 Website available at: www.idhem.nl 
193 Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian. 
0935077 38  
with the necessary language skills, it should be relatively easy for municipalities to cooperate 
with such NGO’s to adjust their websites.       
 However, a CEE-citizen in need of information or assistance may also go to the 
respective municipality directly. In that sense, the respondents were asked if they had persons 
available to assist. It was recognized that language barriers play a significant role and efforts 
are made to combat this. To illustrate, Amsterdam is in the process of implementing an ‘EU-
info desk’. At this desk EU citizens (predominantly CEE-citizens) can obtain relevant 
information or be directed further. Additionally, Amsterdam cooperates with other NGO’s to 
facilitate consulting hours for CEE-citizens, although this is being implemented. On the other 
hand, Westland has already established the ‘Informatiepunt Arbeidsmigranten’, which can be 
visited or reached by telephone. At this service point CEE-citizens can obtain information or 
be directed further. Importantly, it has staff available in CEE-languages; mostly Polish. Apart 
from the clear benefits in terms of communication, such persons may serve as intermediaries 
between the municipality and CEE-citizens. This is of relevance, as CEE-migrants may 
distrust authorities.          
 And lastly, common stereotypes of excessive alcoholism and crime were easily 
refuted, as the respondents stated that such activity does not form a problem any bigger than 
within other population groups. The information retrieved from the respondents falls in line 
with most academic work and can be used to combat negative connotations. Thus, it can be 
safely stated that CEE-migrants cause no significant problems. Overall, most CEE-migrants 
are employed and cause no significant problems within the three municipalities.  
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Conclusion 
 
This work examined the (social) position of CEE-migrants within the Netherlands. The 
reason is the current academic gap, as this predominantly orientates on economic aspects of 
intra-EU migration. Moreover, most studies on CEE-migrants focus within an entire member 
state or within a single area. Additionally, such academic work is based on interviews with 
CEE-migrants, which may not always be accurate. This led to the method of questioning 
three civil servants of Amsterdam, Westland and The Hague. This chapter will start by 
summarizing the findings of previous chapters and the correspondence with the three civil 
servants. By doing so this chapter will construct the (social) situation of CEE-migrants within 
the Netherlands and provide recommendations for policy makers.    
 To start off, CEE-migrants form a large group within the Netherlands: 230.500 as of 
2015. This number is much higher than predicted, confirming that the 2004 and 2007 
enlargement rounds caused a massive influx of CEE-migrants. While there were concerns on 
the forthcoming migration waves leading to the installment of ‘transitional arrangements’, 
these were easily circumvented. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that income levels formed 
the prime motivator for CEE-citizens to migrate.       
 Fears of ‘welfare tourism’ can safely be debunked, as CEE-migrants have low shares 
of receiving social assistance. Moreover, CEE-migrants have high rates of employment, 
clearly indicating most migrated with the intention to (find) work. However, CEE-workers do 
face certain risks concerning labour exploitation and housing- and living conditions. Firstly, 
CEE-workers are prone to underpayment, long working hours and hazardous working 
conditions. Some of these issues are voluntarily, because of higher income levels than in the 
member state of origin. Moreover, CEE-workers tend to reside and work for a limited period, 
earning as much as possible. While overcrowdings occur frequently, this is often desired as it 
forms a way to save money. On the other hand, CEE-migrants often lack Dutch language 
skills, contributing to unawareness of social rights and legislation. Additionally, employers 
and employment agencies often take advantage of the willingness to work below standards; 
as CEE-labour often means cheap labour. Housing accommodations provided by employers 
forms a relevant issue. Such housing is often deduced from CEE-workers’ salary and the link 
between employment and housing makes it difficult for CEE-workers to address concerns. In 
that sense, loss of employment may lead to losing housing. This vulnerable negotiation 
position and the willingness to accept exploitation hinder Dutch labour inspection and NGO’s 
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in their investigations.         
  It can also be safely stated that crime does not form a significant problem 
amongst CEE-migrants. Instead, crime is mostly performed by CEE-career criminals, who 
went to the Netherlands with criminal intent. CEE-migrants suspected of a crime often did so 
out necessity to supplement levels of subsistence: ‘survival crime’. The stereotype of 
‘intoxicated’ CEE-migrants can also be refuted, as findings demonstrate that their share did 
not significantly differ from other ethnic groups. However, alcohol abuse did account for 
most traffic offenses and there are signs of different alcohol cultures in the Netherlands and 
certain CEE-member states. It does appear that CEE-migrants are at risk to get in vulnerable 
social positions, especially regarding the link between losing employment and homelessness. 
This vulnerability is influenced by several factors: difficulty finding new employment, the 
presence of a ‘network of migrants’, and the eligibility to social assistance. These factors are 
particularly pressing for newly arrived CEE-migrants. Moreover, CEE-migrants tend to lack 
(Dutch) language skills, hindering job perspectives and finding their way through 
bureaucracy.          
 From the respondents flow several elements which can be improved. The number of 
(non-registered) CEE-citizens within the three municipalities remains rather clouded. To 
illustrate, even though Westland states to have sufficient data on both registered and non-
registered CEE-citizens, the respondent was in favour of mandatory registration. The other 
aspects subject to improvement are labour exploitation, living- and housing conditions and 
overall communication. Positively, the municipalities attempt to deal with these issues, albeit 
in different manner as shown by differences in the amount of progress. Westland has general 
oversight, while Amsterdam is (re-)establishing this. The Hague falls in between the other 
two municipalities. The Hague has one main concern, which is being investigated: labour 
exploitation. Regarding online- and physical information and accessibility, it can be stated 
that Westland performs best: active cooperation with employers and NGO’s and (online) 
information available in CEE-languages. Moreover, the information point at the city hall has 
staff available in CEE-languages and has decent accessibility. Conversely, The Hague has 
information for CEE-migrants available online, although it does seem to take the approach of 
redirecting to NGO’s. Both Amsterdam and The Hague can improve their accessibility, as 
information desks are either a work in progress or sparingly available. Additionally, The 
Hague and Amsterdam are recommended to speed up their efforts of putting information 
online and in CEE-languages; at the very least in English.     
 The abovementioned differences can be explained in two-fold. Firstly, the 
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municipalities have specific, distinctive characteristics. To illustrate, Amsterdam and The 
Hague are populous cities, comprised of numerous nationalities, form (popular) tourist 
destination and have diverse economies. Westland, on the other hand, has a smaller 
population base and is mostly horticultural. As the horticulture attracted relative large 
numbers of CEE-migrants – predominantly Poles – this formed a new dynamic, meaning 
Westland had to adjust to the influx. What undoubtedly helped Westland is that most CEE-
citizens arrived (with the intention) to work; likely on a temporary basis. As Westland 
actively cooperates with employers, employment agencies and NGO’s, this means that it 
continuously has a general understanding. This stands in contrast with Amsterdam – and to a 
lesser extent The Hague – as this is currently being established. As these two municipalities 
are investigating matters of labour exploitation and housing- and living conditions, it remains 
to be seen whether this calls for further action. What undoubtedly can be stated is that CEE-
migrants do not form a problematic group; instead, they contribute to Dutch society. 
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